July 23, 2026  ·  Complaint filed July 2, 2026  ·  United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 1:26-cv-05671

By David Brunk, civil litigation attorney

Read the complaint

Nexstar v. Google Alleges Ad-Tech Monopoly Blocked Rivals and Fixed Bids

Nexstar Media Inc. and TEGNA Inc. filed suit against Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on July 2, 2026, alleging the defendants monopolized the markets for publisher ad servers and ad exchanges that facilitate the sale of display advertising on the open web. The digital advertising market, valued at $200 billion, has been dominated by Google’s alleged anticompetitive practices, which the complaint contends have allowed the company to manipulate auctions and extract excessive fees from publishers. The complaint, which seeks damages and injunctive relief, alleges Google leveraged its control over the publisher ad server DFP (now Google Ad Manager) to entrench its dominance in the ad exchange AdX, suppressing competition and depressing publisher revenue through schemes including "Last Look," "Dynamic Allocation," "Enhanced Dynamic Allocation (EDA)," and "Project Bernanke." The complaint further details how Google’s "Dynamic Revenue Share (DRS)" system adjusted revenue shares to suppress competition, and how "Unified Pricing Rules (UPR)" eliminated differential price floors, a tool publishers used to mitigate Google’s dominance.

The plaintiffs allege Google’s conduct violates Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, and includes claims for unlawful tying, deceptive practices under New York General Business Law §§ 349-350, common-law fraud, and unjust enrichment. The complaint cites a July 7, 2025, remedies report filed in a prior case, where a federal court held Google "willfully engaged in a series of anticompetitive acts to acquire and maintain monopoly power" in the same markets. According to the complaint, Google’s manipulation of ad space auctions generated $30 billion in revenue for the company in 2022 alone, a figure that underscores the scale of its alleged anticompetitive conduct. The complaint also highlights the broader societal impact of Google’s conduct, citing a U.S. House Antitrust Subcommittee investigation’s finding that Google’s practices "harm ‘the free and diverse press’ and endanger ‘political and economic liberty.’" The U.S. House Antitrust Subcommittee collected 1.3 million documents during its investigation, which revealed the extent of Google’s alleged anticompetitive conduct (Compl. ¶5).

Nexstar and TEGNA, which collectively employ approximately 11,500 journalists and reach more than 100 million unique visitors monthly, allege Google’s monopoly forces them to sell ad inventory through AdX at artificially depressed prices, extracting excessive fees that fund its dominance. Nexstar, a media publisher, employs approximately 6,000 journalists and reaches about 100 million unique visitors monthly across its television and digital platforms, while TEGNA employs around 5,500 full- and part-time employees and reaches more than 100 million people monthly (Compl. ¶29, ¶30). The complaint states Google’s AdX controls 60% to 70% of the ad exchange market and transacted $7.6 billion in gross revenue in 2018—more than all other exchanges combined—while charging a 20% revenue share on each impression’s sale price. The complaint further alleges that Google’s conduct has depressed publisher revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars, citing an example where a publisher’s revenue was reduced by $4.2 million due to Google’s auction manipulations. Google’s ad-tech monopoly forces publishers to sell ad space through Google at depressed prices, as the complaint states: "Google uses this ad tech monopoly to control how publishers sell their ad slots, forcing publishers to sell large shares of that ad space through Google at depressed prices" (Compl. ¶8).

Alleged Mechanism: Tying Google’s Publisher Ad Server (DFP) to Its Ad Exchange (AdX)

The complaint alleges that Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. unlawfully tied their publisher ad server, Google Ad Manager (formerly DoubleClick for Publishers, or DFP), to their ad exchange, AdX, forcing publishers to use both products as a condition of accessing AdX’s real-time bidding. According to the filing, AdX only submits real-time bids when publishers use DFP, while rival ad servers receive static or no bids at all. The complaint cites a prior federal court opinion, which held that this tie "substantially harmed Google’s publisher customers" and eliminated competition in the publisher-ad-serving market. The complaint further alleges that this tying arrangement is a central component of Google’s strategy to monopolize the $200 billion digital advertising market. Google’s control over both the ad server and ad exchange markets allegedly allows it to route 65% to 90% of Plaintiffs’ ad inventory to AdX, even when rival exchanges would pay higher prices (Compl. ¶38).

Google’s DFP controls more than 90% of the publisher-ad-server market, a share the complaint attributes to anticompetitive conduct rather than superior product quality. The complaint cites a prior federal court opinion, which held that Google’s dominance in this market was achieved through a series of exclusionary acts, including the tying of DFP to AdX. The complaint alleges that DFP’s market share grew from approximately 50% to over 90% not due to superior quality, but because of AdX’s leverage. The complaint quotes a prior court opinion, stating that "by restricting AdX’s submission of real-time bids only to DFP, Google made AdX ineffective at its core function when used by publishers who did not also use DFP" (Compl. ¶121). This restriction, the complaint alleges, forces publishers to license DFP to access AdX’s demand, despite the inherent conflict of interest in Google’s dual role as both ad server and exchange. The complaint further alleges that Google’s contracts explicitly link DFP and AdX, making it impossible for publishers to use AdX without also using DFP. This contractual tie, combined with AdX’s 60% to 70% market share in ad exchanges, allegedly coerces publishers into using Google’s ad server.

The result, the complaint alleges, is a self-reinforcing cycle: DFP’s dominance in ad serving entrenches AdX’s dominance in ad exchanges, and vice versa, to the detriment of publishers and competitors. The complaint cites internal Google documents, including one where executives acknowledged that "header bidding," a competitive alternative to Google’s system, was the company’s "greatest threat" (Compl. ¶134). The complaint alleges that this tie depresses publisher revenue by preventing real-time competition among exchanges. For example, the filing states that DFP routes inventory to AdX even when rival exchanges would pay more, and that Google’s auction manipulations—such as "Last Look" and "Dynamic Allocation"—further suppress prices. The complaint provides a detailed example of how Google’s auction manipulations work: in one instance, Google used a bid of $10.01 to win an impression over a rival exchange’s bid of $10.00. After Google’s 20% take, the demand-side platform (DSP) paid $5.01, while the publisher received only $3.20. The complaint alleges that this practice, repeated across billions of impressions, has systematically depressed publisher revenue and enriched Google at the expense of content creators.

The complaint also details how Google’s Enhanced Dynamic Allocation (EDA) system, introduced in 2014 and made mandatory in DFP in 2015, further entrenched AdX’s dominance. EDA assigned near-$0 CPMs to direct deals, allowing AdX to outbid them by a penny and route inventory to itself. The complaint alleges that EDA converted direct deals into “temporary” CPMs, often near $0, allowing AdX to outbid them by a penny (Compl. ¶155). By making EDA mandatory, Google allegedly locked publishers into AdX, preventing them from negotiating with rival exchanges for high-value inventory. The complaint quotes a prior court opinion, which noted that "AdX was the only exchange that could bid in real time for each impression; AdX bid dynamically, while all other exchanges bid statically" (Compl. ¶62).

Alleged Auction Manipulation Schemes: Last Look, Enhanced Dynamic Allocation, and Project Bernanke

The complaint alleges that Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. deployed three overlapping schemes—Last Look, Enhanced Dynamic Allocation (EDA), and Project Bernanke—to manipulate digital advertising auctions, suppress competition, and depress publisher revenue. Each scheme relied on Google’s control over its publisher ad server (DFP) and ad exchange (AdX) to exploit inside information and avoid direct competition with rival exchanges. The complaint details how these schemes allowed Google to manipulate auctions in ways that maximized its own revenue while minimizing payouts to publishers, contributing to the $30 billion in revenue Google allegedly generated from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022. Ad exchange bids are priced in "Cost-Per-Mille" (CPM), where $0.01 per impression equals $10 CPM (Compl. ¶46).

Last Look, later rebranded as Minimum Bid to Win, allowed AdX to see bids from rival exchanges and undercut them by a single penny. The complaint alleges that this practice deprived publishers of higher bids, citing an example where AdX bid $4.01 to win an impression over a rival’s $4.00 bid, despite the existence of a $6.00 bid that Google avoided. Google internally acknowledged the unfairness of the practice, with the complaint quoting an internal document stating, "Last Look was inherently unfair and gave AdX a substantial competitive advantage" (Compl. ¶149). A prior federal court similarly found that Last Look "avoided direct head-to-head competition between AdX and other exchanges" (Compl. ¶68). The complaint provides a detailed breakdown of how Last Look worked: in one example, a rival exchange bid $10.00 for an impression, but AdX used its informational advantage to bid $10.01, winning the auction. After AdX’s 20% take, the DSP paid $5.01, while the publisher received only $3.20. The complaint alleges that this practice, repeated across billions of auctions, systematically depressed publisher revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars. The complaint further alleges that Google offered a discount of $1.99 via Last Look, further suppressing publisher revenue (Compl. ¶70).

Enhanced Dynamic Allocation (EDA), introduced in 2014 and made mandatory in DFP in 2015, further entrenched AdX’s dominance by giving it a "First Look" advantage. The complaint alleges that EDA assigned near-$0 CPMs to direct deals, allowing AdX to outbid them by a penny and route inventory to itself. The complaint quotes a prior court opinion, which noted that "AdX was the only exchange that could bid in real time for each impression; AdX bid dynamically, while all other exchanges bid statically" (Compl. ¶62). By making EDA mandatory, Google allegedly locked publishers into AdX, preventing them from negotiating with rival exchanges for high-value inventory. The complaint alleges that EDA’s manipulation of temporary CPMs allowed Google to suppress publisher revenue by ensuring that AdX always won auctions, even when rival exchanges would have paid more. The complaint provides an example of how EDA worked: in one instance, AdX adjusted its bid from $3.01 to $4.01 to win by a penny, demonstrating how Google’s manipulation of bids allowed it to secure impressions at artificially low prices (Compl. ¶145).

Project Bernanke, launched in 2013 and later updated as Alchemist, allegedly rigged bids to depress publisher revenue by up to 40%. The complaint alleges that Google used a "slush fund" to manipulate auctions, increasing its profit per impression from $1.51 to $3.90. Google internally described the scheme as "stealing money from publishers for billions of impressions every month," according to the complaint (Compl. ¶167). The complaint provides a detailed example of how Bernanke worked: in one auction, Google manipulated bids from $18 to $1, resulting in a publisher payout of just $0.80. The scheme allegedly generated hundreds of millions in additional profit for Google while harming publishers and rival exchanges. The complaint further alleges that Bernanke allowed Google to suppress publisher revenue by up to $4.2 million in specific cases, demonstrating the scale of its impact. The complaint also provides examples of Google Ads bids, which were manipulated from $7.06 to $4.71, further illustrating how Google’s schemes depressed publisher revenue (Compl. ¶168).

The complaint provides additional examples of how Google’s auction manipulations worked in practice. In one instance, AdX could have placed a maximum bid of $4.46 by forgoing its 20% revenue share, but instead chose to bid $3.68 by increasing its revenue share to 30%. This bid allowed AdX to win the auction over a header-bidding bid of $3.67, with the clearing price set at $4.20 (net of fees). In another example, the highest AdX bid (net of fees) was $3.57, demonstrating how Google’s manipulation of revenue shares allowed it to win auctions while minimizing payouts to publishers. The complaint alleges that these schemes collectively allowed Google to avoid competition, depress publisher revenue, and insulate AdX from price pressure. By leveraging its control over DFP and AdX, Google allegedly ensured that publishers had no viable alternatives, forcing them to accept artificially low prices for their ad inventory. The complaint also details how Google’s Dynamic Revenue Share (DRS) system adjusted AdX’s 20% take rate to win auctions, harming third-party exchanges and further suppressing publisher revenue (Compl. ¶75).

Market Shares and Revenue: Google’s Dominance in Publisher Ad Servers and Ad Exchanges

The complaint alleges that Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. maintain monopoly control over two critical segments of the digital advertising technology stack: publisher ad servers and ad exchanges. According to the filing, Google’s DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP), now rebranded as Google Ad Manager, controls more than 90% of the publisher ad-server market, a share the complaint attributes to anticompetitive conduct rather than superior product quality. The complaint cites a prior federal court opinion, which held that Google’s dominance in this market was achieved through a series of exclusionary acts, including the tying of DFP to its ad exchange, AdX. The digital advertising market, valued at $200 billion, has been dominated by Google’s alleged manipulation of ad space auctions, which the complaint alleges generated $30 billion in revenue for the company in 2022 alone. The complaint also notes that Google’s ad-serving fees are 8 to 11 times higher than those of competitors, with no corresponding improvement in functionality or service quality (Compl. ¶89).

In the ad exchange market, the complaint alleges that Google’s AdX controls 60% to 70% of transactions for open-web display advertising. Between 2018 and 2022, AdX transacted 63% to 71% of worldwide open-web display transactions, a share that the complaint argues reflects Google’s ability to suppress competition through schemes like "Last Look" and "Project Bernanke." In 2018 alone, AdX generated $7.6 billion in gross revenue, an amount the complaint states exceeded the combined revenue of all other ad exchanges. The complaint further alleges that AdX’s 20% take rate on each impression’s sale price is direct evidence of its monopoly power, citing a prior court’s finding that "AdX’s durable 20% take rate constitutes direct evidence of monopoly power" (Compl. ¶104). The complaint contrasts this with rival exchanges, which slashed their take rates to 12% or lower in 2017 but were unable to dislodge AdX’s dominance. The complaint also highlights that Google charges Plaintiffs a 5% to 10% revenue share for Programmatic Guaranteed and Preferred Deals, further illustrating its ability to extract excessive fees from publishers (Compl. ¶33).

The complaint contrasts Google’s market dominance with the competitive constraints faced by rival ad-tech providers. It alleges that Google’s ad-serving fees are 8 to 11 times higher than those of competitors, with no corresponding improvement in functionality or service quality. The filing quotes a prior court opinion, which stated that "Google was not concerned about degrading service because publishers had no credible alternatives to DFP" (Compl. ¶89). The complaint attributes this lack of alternatives to Google’s alleged anticompetitive conduct, including the tying of DFP to AdX and the suppression of header bidding, which the filing describes as the "greatest threat" to Google’s monopoly. The complaint further alleges that Google’s auction manipulations, such as Last Look and Project Bernanke, have systematically depressed publisher revenue, citing an example where a publisher’s revenue was reduced by $4.2 million due to Google’s conduct. The complaint also notes that switching ad servers is costly, complex, and risky to revenue, with tens of millions of ad auctions per day at stake for publishers (Compl. ¶90).

The complaint also highlights the financial impact of Google’s alleged monopoly on publishers. It alleges that Google’s control over both the ad server and ad exchange markets allows it to depress publisher revenue by routing inventory to AdX at artificially low prices, even when rival exchanges would pay more. The filing cites internal Google documents and prior court findings to support its claim that Google’s conduct has harmed competition and entrenched its dominance in the digital advertising ecosystem. The complaint provides a detailed example of how Google’s auction manipulations work: in one instance, Google used a bid of $10.01 to win an impression over a rival exchange’s bid of $10.00. After Google’s 20% take, the DSP paid $5.01, while the publisher received only $3.20. The complaint alleges that this practice, repeated across billions of impressions, has systematically depressed publisher revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars. The complaint also notes that Plaintiffs’ ad inventory is sold through both direct deals (10% to 35% of inventory) and indirect sales (65% to 90% of inventory), with direct deals accounting for an outsized share of digital ad revenue (Compl. ¶38).

Parties and Roles: Nexstar, TEGNA, Google, and Alphabet

Nexstar Media Inc. and TEGNA Inc., both Delaware corporations, are the plaintiffs in the complaint filed July 2, 2026, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Nexstar, a media publisher, employs approximately 6,000 journalists and reaches about 100 million unique visitors monthly across its television and digital platforms. The complaint alleges Nexstar funds its journalism primarily through digital advertising sales, which are critical to its operations. In 2025, Nexstar received 532 awards for its journalistic excellence, underscoring the importance of its content to the public. TEGNA, another media publisher, employs around 5,500 full- and part-time employees and reaches more than 100 million people monthly. Like Nexstar, TEGNA relies on digital advertising revenue to support its content production, including the 1,700 hours of news it produces weekly. In 2025, TEGNA received 65 Edward R. Murrow Awards, highlighting its commitment to high-quality journalism (Compl. ¶29, ¶30).

The defendants are Google LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and Alphabet Inc., a Delaware corporation and Google’s parent company. The complaint alleges Alphabet exercises day-to-day control over Google’s operations and that Google functions as Alphabet’s alter ego (Compl. ¶21). Google is described as the dominant provider of digital advertising technology, controlling key components of the ad-tech stack, including the publisher ad server (Google Ad Manager, formerly DFP) and the ad exchange (AdX). The complaint contends Google’s conduct in these markets has monopolized the sale of display advertising on the open web, harming publishers like Nexstar and TEGNA. The complaint further alleges that Google’s manipulation of ad space auctions generated $30 billion in revenue for the company in 2022, a figure that underscores the scale of its alleged anticompetitive conduct. Google’s ad-tech monopoly forces publishers to sell ad space through Google at depressed prices, as the complaint states: "Google uses this ad tech monopoly to control how publishers sell their ad slots, forcing publishers to sell large shares of that ad space through Google at depressed prices" (Compl. ¶8).

The complaint identifies several non-party entities that play roles in the digital advertising ecosystem. Amazon provides a server-side header-bidding product called Amazon TAM, while Prebid Server offers a third-party alternative for header bidding. Rival ad exchanges include Rubicon (now Magnite), AppNexus (now Xandr), and Index Exchange. The complaint also notes that former competitors, such as Microsoft, Yahoo!, 24/7 Real Media, aQuantive, ValueClick, and AdBrite, have exited the market, leaving Google with little competition in publisher ad serving and ad exchanges. The complaint alleges that Google’s dominance in these markets has forced publishers to sell ad inventory through Google’s platforms at artificially depressed prices, reducing their revenue and undermining their ability to fund journalism. The complaint also highlights the role of the U.S. House Antitrust Subcommittee, which conducted an investigation into Google’s practices and released a final report on April 15, 2021, concluding that Google’s conduct harms "the free and diverse press" and endangers "political and economic liberty" (Compl. ¶5).

The plaintiffs allege that Google’s dominance in the $200 billion digital advertising market has forced them to sell ad inventory through Google’s platforms at artificially depressed prices. The complaint cites an example where Google’s auction manipulations depressed a publisher’s revenue by $4.2 million, demonstrating the scale of the alleged harm. The complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief, including potential structural remedies to restore competition in the digital advertising industry. The filing also highlights the broader societal impact of Google’s conduct, citing a U.S. House investigation’s finding that Google’s practices "harm ‘the free and diverse press’ and endanger ‘political and economic liberty.’" The complaint notes that Plaintiffs fill tens of millions of ad impressions daily across their web properties and mobile apps, underscoring the scale of their operations and the potential impact of Google’s alleged anticompetitive conduct (Compl. ¶37).

Antitrust and Related Claims (Plaintiffs vs. Google/Alphabet)

The complaint alleges seven causes of action against Google LLC and Alphabet Inc., encompassing violations of federal antitrust laws, state consumer-protection statutes, and common-law principles. These claims target Google’s alleged monopolization of the publisher ad-server and ad-exchange markets, as well as its deceptive practices and unjust enrichment at the expense of publishers like Nexstar and TEGNA.

Count 1: Monopolization of the Market for General Publisher Ad Servers for Open Display Inventory (Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2)

The complaint alleges that Google monopolized the market for general publisher ad servers—software that determines whether a publisher fills an ad slot via a direct deal or an ad exchange auction—by leveraging its dominance in the ad-exchange market. Google’s DFP (now Google Ad Manager) controls more than 90% of this market, a share a federal court found was acquired and maintained through anticompetitive acts, including the unlawful tie between DFP and AdX. The complaint cites internal Google documents acknowledging that publishers "had no credible alternatives to DFP," a condition a court described as evidence of monopoly power. The complaint further alleges that Google’s conduct has allowed it to dominate the $200 billion digital advertising market, generating $30 billion in revenue from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022 alone. The complaint also notes that Google charges Plaintiffs a 5% to 10% revenue share for Programmatic Guaranteed and Preferred Deals, further illustrating its ability to extract excessive fees from publishers (Compl. ¶33).

Count 2: Monopolization of the Market for Ad Exchanges for Open Display Inventory (Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2)

The complaint alleges that Google monopolized the market for ad exchanges—platforms that facilitate real-time auctions for open-web display inventory—through a combination of exclusionary contracts, auction manipulations, and deceptive practices. Google’s AdX controls 60% to 70% of this market, a share a federal court held was maintained through anticompetitive conduct, including "Last Look," "Dynamic Allocation," and "Project Bernanke." The complaint highlights AdX’s durable 20% take rate as evidence of monopoly power, noting that rival exchanges slashed their take rates to 12% or lower in 2017 but were unable to dislodge AdX’s dominance. The complaint alleges that Google’s auction manipulations, such as Last Look and Project Bernanke, have systematically depressed publisher revenue, citing an example where a publisher’s revenue was reduced by $4.2 million due to Google’s conduct. The complaint also notes that AdX transacted 63% to 71% of worldwide open-web display transactions between 2018 and 2022, further illustrating its dominance in the market (Compl. ¶101).

Count 3: Attempted Monopolization of the Market for Ad Exchanges for Open Display Inventory (Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2)

The complaint alleges that Google engaged in a course of conduct with the specific intent to monopolize the ad-exchange market, even if it did not fully succeed in eliminating all competition. The complaint cites Google’s suppression of header bidding—a competitive threat the company internally described as its "greatest threat"—as evidence of this intent. Google executives allegedly warned that if header bidding "consolidates all non-Google demand, we could lose our must-call status and be disintermediated" (Compl. ¶134). The complaint also points to Google’s 2023 and 2024 announcements that its demand-side platforms (Google Ads and DV360) would stop bidding if publishers used third-party ad servers, a move the complaint characterizes as an attempt to foreclose competition. The complaint further alleges that Google’s conduct has allowed it to generate $30 billion in revenue from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022, demonstrating the scale of its alleged anticompetitive conduct. The complaint also notes that Google’s search monopoly locks advertiser demand into AdX, further entrenching its dominance in the ad exchange market (Compl. ¶106).

Count 4: Unlawful Tying in Violation of Sherman Act § 1 (15 U.S.C. § 1)

The complaint alleges that Google unlawfully tied its publisher ad server (DFP) to its ad exchange (AdX), forcing publishers to use DFP to access AdX’s real-time bids. A federal court held that this tie "substantially harmed Google’s publisher customers" and eliminated competition in the publisher-ad-serving market. The complaint details how Google’s contracts for Google Ad Manager (GAM) link DFP and AdX, making it impossible for publishers to access AdX’s real-time bids without using DFP. The complaint quotes a prior court finding that "by restricting AdX’s submission of real-time bids only to DFP, Google made AdX ineffective at its core function when used by publishers who did not also use DFP" (Compl. ¶121). The complaint alleges that this tie has allowed Google to dominate the $200 billion digital advertising market, generating $30 billion in revenue from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022. The complaint also notes that Google’s tie between DFP and AdX is reinforced by its control over the demand-side platform (DSP) market, where Google Ads and DV360 account for a significant share of advertiser demand. The complaint alleges that Google locks advertisers into AdX by withholding DV360 features, such as Chrome browsing history targeting, if they use other exchanges (Compl. ¶120).

Count 5: Unlawful Deceptive Acts or Practices in Violation of New York General Business Law §§ 349–350

The complaint alleges that Google engaged in deceptive acts or practices by misrepresenting the mechanics of its auctions, withholding critical data from publishers, and falsely claiming to end anticompetitive programs like "Last Look." The complaint cites Google’s internal admission that "Last Look is inherently unfair" and its contractual promise not to use header-bidding data for bids, while secretly using that data to undercut competitors (Compl. ¶149). The complaint also alleges that Google misrepresented its auction rules, claiming AdX ran a second-price auction while secretly manipulating it through schemes like "Project Bernanke." These deceptions, the complaint alleges, prevented publishers from detecting Google’s anticompetitive conduct and deprived them of the ability to negotiate fair terms. The complaint further alleges that Google’s deceptive practices have allowed it to generate $30 billion in revenue from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022, while depressing publisher revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars. The complaint also notes that Google withheld data fields such as KeyPart and TimeUsec2, which publishers needed to verify auction fairness, and failed to disclose how its Dynamic Revenue Share (DRS) system adjusted revenue shares to suppress competition (Compl. ¶159).

Statutory References

The complaint cites several federal and state statutes to support its claims against Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. These include:

• Sherman Act § 1 (15 U.S.C. § 1): Prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, including unlawful tying arrangements. The complaint alleges Google violated this provision by tying its publisher ad server (DFP) to its ad exchange (AdX), forcing publishers to use both products as a condition of accessing AdX’s real-time bids. The complaint also alleges that Google’s conduct has allowed it to dominate the $200 billion digital advertising market, generating $30 billion in revenue from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022.
• Sherman Act § 2 (15 U.S.C. § 2): Prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize. The complaint alleges Google violated this provision by monopolizing the markets for publisher ad servers and ad exchanges, as well as attempting to monopolize the ad-exchange market through exclusionary conduct. The complaint cites a prior federal court opinion, which held that Google’s conduct violated Sherman Act § 2, and notes that the Southern District of New York gave preclusive effect to these findings on October 27, 2025 (Compl. ¶16).
• Clayton Act § 4 (15 U.S.C. § 15): Provides for treble damages for violations of federal antitrust laws. The complaint seeks treble damages for Google’s alleged monopolization and tying conduct, citing the $30 billion in revenue Google generated from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022 as evidence of the scale of its anticompetitive conduct. The complaint also notes that Google’s auction manipulations, such as Last Look and Project Bernanke, have systematically depressed publisher revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars.
• Clayton Act § 16 (15 U.S.C. § 26): Provides for injunctive relief to prevent violations of federal antitrust laws. The complaint seeks injunctive relief, including structural remedies, to restore competition in the digital advertising ecosystem and prevent Google from continuing its alleged anticompetitive practices. The complaint explicitly references the potential breakup of Google’s ad-tech business as a remedy, noting that "all that remains in the Eastern District of Virginia case is to decide the appropriate remedy, including a potential breakup of Google’s digital advertising monopolies" (Compl. ¶16).
• New York General Business Law §§ 349–350: Prohibits deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of business. The complaint alleges Google violated these provisions by misrepresenting the mechanics of its auctions, withholding critical data from publishers, and falsely claiming to end anticompetitive programs like "Last Look." The complaint cites Google’s internal admission that "Last Look is inherently unfair" and its contractual promise not to use header-bidding data for bids, while secretly using that data to undercut competitors (Compl. ¶149).

Claims for Common-Law Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, and Distinctive Pleadings (Counts 6–7)

The complaint alleges that Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. engaged in common-law fraud by misrepresenting the mechanics of its ad auctions and withholding critical data from publishers, preventing them from detecting anticompetitive conduct. In Count 6, Nexstar Media Inc. and TEGNA Inc. contend that Google’s deceptive practices included falsely characterizing its AdX exchange as a second-price auction while secretly manipulating it through schemes like Project Bernanke. The complaint alleges Google misrepresented how its Enhanced Dynamic Allocation (EDA) system prioritized bids, assigning near-zero temporary CPMs to direct deals to allow AdX to outbid them by a penny. Google also allegedly withheld data fields such as KeyPart and TimeUsec2, which publishers needed to verify auction fairness, and failed to disclose how its Dynamic Revenue Share (DRS) system adjusted revenue shares to suppress competition. Internally, Google acknowledged the unfairness of its practices, with employees admitting that "Last Look is inherently unfair" and that the company was "intentionally withholding details from publishers" (Compl. ¶149).

The complaint further alleges that Google’s conduct harmed the free and diverse press, citing a U.S. House investigation’s finding that Google’s practices "harm ‘the free and diverse press’ and endanger ‘political and economic liberty.’" The U.S. House Antitrust Subcommittee collected 1.3 million documents during its investigation, which revealed the extent of Google’s alleged anticompetitive conduct (Compl. ¶5). Nexstar and TEGNA, which collectively employ over 11,500 journalists and produce thousands of hours of news weekly, allege that Google’s deceptive auction manipulations depressed their ad revenue, directly threatening their ability to fund journalism. The complaint states that Google’s conduct "deprived Plaintiffs of the ability to negotiate fair terms for the sale of their ad inventory" and "prevented Plaintiffs from detecting Google’s anticompetitive conduct." The complaint provides a detailed example of how Google’s auction manipulations work: in one instance, Google used a bid of $10.01 to win an impression over a rival exchange’s bid of $10.00. After Google’s 20% take, the DSP paid $5.01, while the publisher received only $3.20. The complaint alleges that this practice, repeated across billions of auctions, has systematically depressed publisher revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars. The complaint also notes that Google’s auction manipulations included offering a discount of $1.99 via Last Look, further suppressing publisher revenue (Compl. ¶70).

In Count 7, the complaint alleges unjust enrichment, contending that Google retained billions of dollars in ill-gotten profits from its anticompetitive and deceptive practices. The complaint cites Google’s AdX exchange, which generated $7.6 billion in gross revenue in 2018—more than all other exchanges combined—as evidence of its ability to extract excessive fees due to its monopoly power. The complaint alleges that Google’s 20% revenue share on AdX transactions, sustained by schemes like Last Look and Project Bernanke, far exceeded the 12% or lower rates charged by rival exchanges. Plaintiffs contend that Google’s conduct depressed publisher revenue by up to 40% while enriching itself by hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The complaint cites an example where Google’s auction manipulations depressed a publisher’s revenue by $4.2 million, demonstrating the scale of the alleged harm. The complaint seeks restitution for the "unjust benefits" Google obtained through its alleged fraud and monopolization, including the profits derived from its auction manipulations and deceptive practices. The complaint also notes that Google’s auction manipulations included adjusting bids from $7.06 to $4.71, further illustrating how its schemes depressed publisher revenue (Compl. ¶168).

The fraud and unjust enrichment claims are distinct from the antitrust counts in that they focus on Google’s alleged misrepresentations and the retention of ill-gotten gains, rather than the monopolistic structure of the ad-tech markets. The complaint alleges that Google’s deceptive practices were not merely incidental to its anticompetitive conduct but were integral to maintaining its dominance, as they prevented publishers from detecting or challenging its auction manipulations. The complaint cites a prior federal court ruling as evidence that Google’s conduct was both anticompetitive and deceptive, with the court holding that Google’s schemes "substantially harmed its publisher customers." The complaint further alleges that Google’s conduct has allowed it to generate $30 billion in revenue from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022, while depressing publisher revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars. The complaint also notes that Google’s ad-serving fees are 8 to 11 times higher than those of competitors, with no added functionality, further illustrating its ability to extract excessive profits from publishers (Compl. ¶89).

Relief Sought and Procedural Posture: Damages, Injunctive Relief, and Structural Remedies

Nexstar Media Inc. and TEGNA Inc. seek treble damages under Clayton Act § 4 (15 U.S.C. § 15) for Google LLC and Alphabet Inc.’s alleged monopolization of the publisher ad-server and ad-exchange markets. The complaint alleges Google’s anticompetitive conduct depressed publisher revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars, citing internal Google documents that describe its auction manipulations as "stealing money from publishers for billions of impressions every month" (Compl. ¶167). Plaintiffs also demand injunctive relief under Clayton Act § 16 (15 U.S.C. § 26), including structural remedies to restore competition in the digital advertising ecosystem. The complaint explicitly references the potential breakup of Google’s ad-tech business as a remedy, noting that "all that remains in the prior federal case is to decide the appropriate remedy, including a potential breakup of Google’s digital advertising monopolies" (Compl. ¶16).

The complaint provides a detailed account of how Google’s auction manipulations have systematically depressed publisher revenue. For example, the complaint alleges that Google’s "Project Bernanke" scheme allowed the company to manipulate bids, increasing its profit per impression from $1.51 to $3.90. In one instance, Google manipulated bids from $18 to $1, resulting in a publisher payout of just $0.80. The complaint further alleges that Google’s auction manipulations have depressed publisher revenue by up to $4.2 million in specific cases, demonstrating the scale of the alleged harm. The complaint also details how Google’s "Last Look" scheme allowed AdX to undercut rival exchanges by a single penny, depriving publishers of higher bids. In one example, AdX bid $4.01 to win an impression over a rival’s $4.00 bid, despite the existence of a $6.00 bid that Google avoided. The complaint also notes that Google’s auction manipulations included adjusting bids from $3.01 to $4.01 to win by a penny, further illustrating how its schemes suppressed publisher revenue (Compl. ¶145).

Procedurally, the case enters a landscape where Google’s liability for monopolization has already been adjudicated in parallel litigation. A federal court’s 2025 opinion established that Google’s conduct violated Sherman Act § 2, and the Southern District of New York’s preclusive effect ruling eliminates the need for plaintiffs to relitigate those findings. The complaint thus frames its damages claim as a direct consequence of Google’s proven anticompetitive acts, while its injunctive relief request aligns with the structural remedies under consideration in the DOJ’s case. The complaint cites the $30 billion in revenue Google generated from manipulating ad space auctions in 2022 as evidence of the scale of its alleged anticompetitive conduct, and seeks to hold the company accountable for the hundreds of millions of dollars in depressed publisher revenue. The complaint also notes that Google’s ad exchange, AdX, transacted 63% to 71% of worldwide open-web display transactions between 2018 and 2022, further illustrating its dominance in the market (Compl. ¶101).

The allegations remain unproven, and Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. have not yet filed a response in this matter.

The allegations described here are taken from the filing and remain unproven; no responsive pleading is reflected in the source document.

The allegations described here are taken from the filing and remain unproven; no responsive pleading is reflected in the source document.

David Brunk is a civil litigation attorney. He can be reached at david@newmanbrunk.com.