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**Attorneys for Plaintiffs**

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

**DIRECTORS GUILD OF  
AMERICA – PRODUCER  
PENSION PLANS,**

**and**

**TRUSTEES OF THE DIRECTORS  
GUILD OF AMERICA –  
PRODUCER PENSION PLANS,**

**Plaintiffs,**

**vs.**

**METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER  
PICTURES, INC.,**

**Defendant.**

Case No.: 2:26-cv-07018

**COMPLAINT**

Nature of the Case

1. In 2008, Defendant Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM” or “Defendant”), along with two other movie studios, created a pay television service they named Epix. In 2017, MGM bought out the other studios’ interests in Epix, owning it

1 alone until it renamed the service MGM+ in 2023. Shortly after establishing Epix,  
2 MGM entered into distribution licenses with it at artificially low rates, reflecting the  
3 fact that the parties were not negotiating at arm's length. These licenses allowed  
4 Epix to exhibit movies and television shows licensed to it by MGM to Epix  
5 subscribers, both at set times and on demand, and further allowed Epix to  
6 subdistribute MGM-produced materials to other streaming services, including  
7 Netflix, Hulu, Paramount+, and Amazon.

8 2. By entering into this sweetheart distribution license arrangement with  
9 Epix, MGM was able to report artificially low license revenue to the Directors  
10 Guild of America ("DGA"), the union representing employees responsible for  
11 creating MGM's movies and television shows, as well as to the Plaintiff Directors  
12 Guild of America - Producer Basic Pension Plan ("Pension Plan"), the benefit fund  
13 responsible for providing the DGA-represented employees their pension benefits,  
14 and as to which MGM has pension contribution obligations as a participating  
15 employer. The Pension Plan only learned that MGM had used its self-dealing  
16 arrangement with Epix to shirk its pension contributions years after the Pension  
17 Plan received MGM's understated contributions, and the Pension Plan still has not  
18 received information that would reveal the full scope of the underpayments.

19 3. This is an action for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, as well as for  
20 statutory and contract damages, and seeks an order requiring the Defendant to  
21 furnish information to the Pension Plan to allow it to obtain and audit the records  
22 necessary to determine the extent to which Defendant has breached its obligations  
23 to make all contribution payments to the Plan, and to pay delinquent contributions  
24 owed to the Pension Plan arising from Defendant's self-dealing distribution  
25 licensing scheme.

26 4. This action is brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income  
27 Security Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. (hereinafter "ERISA"), and §  
28

1 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §  
2 185(a) (hereinafter “LMRA”).

3 Jurisdiction and Venue

4 5. The Court has jurisdiction of this action under the terms of 29 U.S.C. §  
5 1132, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

6 6. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)  
7 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) because this is the district in which the Defendant  
8 resides and because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to  
9 Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.

10 Parties and Related Entities

11 7. The Pension Plan is an employee benefit plan established and  
12 maintained pursuant to Section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).  
13 Plaintiff Pension Plan is an employee pension benefit plan within the meaning of  
14 Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(2) and (3), and is maintained  
15 for the purpose of providing retirement and related benefits to over 25,000 eligible  
16 participants and beneficiaries. Plaintiff Pension Plan is also a multiemployer  
17 pension plan within the meaning of Section 3(37) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37).

18 8. Plaintiff Trustees of the Pension Plan (“Trustees”) are appointed by the  
19 employers and the DGA pursuant to the terms of the Pension Plan Trust Agreement  
20 and LMRA § 302. Trustees are jointly responsible for administering the Pension  
21 Plan and are fiduciaries within the meaning of Section 3(21)(A) of ERISA, 29  
22 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).

23 9. Plaintiffs maintain their principal place of business at 5055 Wilshire  
24 Blvd, in Los Angeles, California.

25 10. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of the Pension Plan and on behalf  
26 of Pension Plan participants and beneficiaries pursuant to Section 502(a)(3) of  
27 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

11. Defendant MGM is a Delaware corporation and an employer in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(5), 3(11), and 3(12) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(5), (11) and (12), and Sections 2(2), 2(6) and 2(7) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (6) and (7).

12. Defendant does business and resides in the state of California. Its principal place of business is 9300 Culver Blvd, Culver City, California. That location is within this judicial district.

13. The Directors Guild of America (“DGA”) is an “employee organization” under ERISA § 2(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(4), and a “labor organization” under LMRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). The DGA represents motion picture directors, unit production managers, assistant directors, associate directors, stage managers, and production associates (collectively, “covered employees”) in dealing with employers in the motion picture industry. The DGA has a principal place of business in Los Angeles, California.

14. Epix was a pay television company created in 2008 by MGM, Paramount/Viacom, and Lionsgate Studios. Epix exhibited content to its subscribers licensed to it by, *inter alia*, the three studios that created it, both on a predetermined schedule set by Epix, and also in a user-determined on-demand format through its streaming service. In 2017, MGM bought out Lionsgate’s and Paramount/Viacom’s interests in Epix for approximately one billion dollars and continued to operate the pay television and on-demand streaming service as an exhibitor of licensed MGM content until 2023, when Defendant rebranded Epix as “MGM+.”

## STATEMENT OF THE CLAIMS

### *The Basic Agreements*

15. MGM is a motion picture studio that produces movies and television programs (together “motion pictures”), which it exhibits through distribution licenses in various formats and media.

1           16. For periods prior to 2008 through the present, MGM was party to a  
2 series of industry-wide collective-bargaining agreements with the DGA, referred to  
3 as “Basic Agreements,” for production of motion pictures.

4           17. The Basic Agreements include and incorporate a series of sideletter  
5 agreements, including, as relevant here, Sideletter 15. Sideletter 15, first entered  
6 into in 2002, has been updated by the parties multiple times.

7           18. The Basic Agreements are contracts between an employer and a labor  
8 organization within the meaning of Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

9           19. MGM and the DGA remained bound by the terms of the Basic  
10 Agreements governing pension contributions during all periods relevant to this  
11 action.

12           20. Each of the Basic Agreements requires Defendant to make payments  
13 to the Pension Fund for the purposes of providing pensions to employees working  
14 in the bargaining unit represented by the DGA, and for defraying the Pension Plan’s  
15 administrative costs. These required payments are “contributions” under ERISA  
16 section 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145.

17           21. Each of the Basic Agreements requires signatory employers, including  
18 Defendant, to make pension contributions to the Pension Plan. Employers’  
19 contribution obligations are a percentage of both the wages paid to individual  
20 employees and on the employers’ revenue from various forms of commercial  
21 exploitation of motion pictures covered by the Basic Agreement.

22           22. Each of the Basic Agreements further provides that Defendant agrees  
23 to accept and be bound by the provisions of the Pension Plan Trust Agreement. The  
24 provisions of the Trust Agreement are “terms of the plan” within the meaning of  
25 Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and the “terms and conditions  
26 of such plan” within the meaning of Section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145.

27           23. The Pension Plan’s Trust Agreement provides that an employer who  
28 fails to pay required contributions to the Pension Plan is liable to the Pension Plan

1 not only for the delinquent contributions, but also for the greater of interest (at a  
2 rate set by the Plan Trustees or the Legal and Delinquency Committee) or  
3 liquidated damages.

4 24. Under the Trust Agreement, for delinquencies of more than 60 days,  
5 liquidated damages equal 20 percent of the delinquent contribution amount.

6 25. The Trust Agreement further provides that, in the event an action or  
7 proceeding is commenced against an employer to recover delinquent contributions,  
8 the employer is liable for *both* interest on delinquent contributions and the greater  
9 of 20% liquidated damages or accrued interest, in addition to reasonable attorneys'  
10 fees and costs, and all other relief provided by law or equity.

11 26. The Trust Agreement requires employers, including Defendant, to  
12 make such reports and statements to the Plan Trustees with respect to the amount  
13 and calculation of any and all contributions remitted (or required to be remitted) to  
14 the Pension Fund as the Plan Trustees may deem necessary or desirable.

15 27. The Trust Agreement further provides that the Pension Plan's  
16 representatives may audit or cause the audit or inspection of the records of any  
17 employer, including Defendant, which may be pertinent in connection with the  
18 contributions and/or reports described in Paragraph 26, insofar as the same may be  
19 necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Pension Plan. If any such audit or  
20 inspection discloses a delinquency, the Trust Agreement provides that the cost of  
21 the audit or inspection shall be borne by the employer. If attorneys' fees are  
22 expended to compel such an audit or inspection or to collect amounts outstanding  
23 from an employer, the employer is required to pay attorneys' fees, the costs of the  
24 audit or inspection, interest penalties or liquidated damages, and court costs  
25 incurred by the Trustees in connection with any necessary litigation.

*Supplemental Market/New Media Contributions and Licensing to Related or  
Affiliated Entities*

28. Apart from exhibiting its motion pictures in theaters and on free television, MGM has licensed its motion pictures for distribution in other media, including through exhibition on pay television, through videotape and DVD media (referred to in the Basic Agreement as “Supplemental Markets”), and, more recently, through streaming on the internet, mobile devices, and other platforms (such streaming-based distribution platforms are collectively referred to by the parties as “New Media”).

29. In connection with MGM’s licensing a motion picture for distribution and exhibition in Supplemental Markets and New Media, Defendant is required by the Basic Agreements to report and pay over a portion of its revenue attributable to such licensing to the covered employees working on the motion picture as additional compensation, and to pay over a portion to the Pension Plan as additional contributions. The revenue related to Defendant’s distribution of motion pictures in Supplemental Markets and New Media is referred to as the “Employer’s gross.”

30. Under the terms of the Basic Agreement, including Sideletter 15, Defendant is and has been obligated to share 1.2% of the Employer’s gross from distributing a motion picture in New Media and Supplemental Markets as “additional compensation.” Of the 1.2% of the Employer’s gross for a motion picture, one-third (or 0.4% of the Employer’s gross) is to be paid to the Pension Plan as Pension Plan contributions, with the remainder to be paid to the motion picture’s director and in most instances to certain other employees covered by the Basic Agreement who worked on the motion picture.

31. Under the definition of “Employer’s gross” applicable to Supplemental Markets and New Media, set forth in Paragraph 18-103(b) of the Basic Agreement, when Defendant does not distribute the motion picture directly, but rather employs a subdistributor to distribute the motion picture, the “Employer’s gross” shall

1 include the “worldwide total receipts derived by such subdistributor from licensing  
2 the right to exhibit the motion picture[.]”

3 32. In addition, under Sideletter 15, at least since 2008, when the  
4 Defendant’s Employer’s gross “derived from New Media . . . exploitation is  
5 received from a related or affiliated entity that acts as the exhibitor/retailer of such  
6 Picture,” then the “Employer’s gross received by the [Defendant] from the licensing  
7 of such rights shall be measured by the exhibitor/retailer’s payments to unrelated  
8 and unaffiliated entities in arms’ length transactions for comparable pictures, or, if  
9 none, then the amounts received by the Employer from unrelated and unaffiliated  
10 exhibitors/retailers in arms’ length transactions for comparable pictures, or, if none,  
11 a comparable exhibitor/retailer’s payments to comparable unrelated and unaffiliated  
12 entities in arms’ length transactions for comparable pictures.”

13 33. The Basic Agreements and the Trust Agreement require that each  
14 quarter MGM must report the Employer’s gross receipts in Supplemental Markets  
15 and New Media for each such licensed motion picture and pay to the Pension Plan  
16 its one-third share of the 1.2% of the Employer’s gross as Pension Plan  
17 contributions.

18 34. Under the terms of the Basic Agreement, including Sideletter 15,  
19 Defendant is and has been obligated to furnish reports to the DGA showing the  
20 Employer’s gross for each motion picture exhibited in Supplemental Markets and  
21 New Media with respect to which the Defendant is required to make supplemental  
22 compensation payments, and to do so within a reasonable time, not exceeding 60  
23 days, after each fiscal or calendar quarter. Concurrently with providing the reports  
24 referenced above, Defendant is required to make its pension contributions due to  
25 the Pension Plan from the Employer’s gross for each such motion picture.  
26  
27  
28

*MGM Supplemental Market and New Media Licensing, MGM-Epix SVOD  
Licensing*

35. For decades, MGM has made contributions to the Pension Plan in connection with revenue received from distributing its motion pictures in Supplemental Markets. On information and belief, until about 15-20 years ago, the bulk of MGM's revenue in Supplemental Markets (apart from revenue obtained from videotape and DVD licensing) was derived from licensing its motion pictures in the pay television model, such as HBO, Cinemax, and Showtime. The original pay television model market allowed consumers to purchase defined period subscriptions for "premium channels" and view content, including content licensed by Defendant, at predetermined times on the schedule set by the pay television service, similar to the manner in which broadcast television is made available to view. This viewing model is known in the industry as a "linear" distribution model. In a linear platform, the subscriber could view the motion picture or program on the schedule set by the pay television service, but could not select the motion picture or program to be viewed at any time the subscriber wanted.

36. Over time, technological developments allowed pay television and New Media services, such as Netflix, to exhibit content in an on-demand streaming format. In this format, the subscriber could select any available licensed material to be viewed at any time they chose. This consumption model is known as "Subscription Video On Demand" or "SVOD."

37. The SVOD format for exhibiting content provided motion picture producers, including MGM, additional valuable licensing opportunities to distribute their motion pictures over the internet or through other media in streaming formats.

38. Prior to the creation of Epix, Defendant entered into a licensing agreement with Showtime Networks (hereinafter, "Showtime") permitting Showtime to exhibit Defendant's theatrical "output"—that is, the motion pictures Defendant released in theaters during the term of the Showtime license—on

1 Showtime’s pay television services. That licensing agreement did not provide  
2 Showtime with the right to subdistribute Defendant’s motion pictures to other  
3 exhibitors. Other studios, including Paramount Pictures and Lionsgate, also  
4 licensed their theatrical output to Showtime during the same time frame.

5 39. In or around 2008, each of Defendant, Paramount Pictures, and  
6 Lionsgate were engaged in individual negotiations with Showtime to renew their  
7 output licensing agreements. However, instead of renewing their licenses with  
8 Showtime, Defendant, Paramount, and Lionsgate formed their own pay television  
9 service, Epix, which launched to the public in 2009.

10 40. Since Epix launched, MGM has licensed its motion pictures to Epix  
11 for exhibition via pay television and SVOD.

12 41. In 2017, Defendant bought out Paramount’s and Lionsgate’s interests  
13 in Epix for just over \$1 billion, thereby becoming the sole owner of Epix.

14 42. Following Defendant’s buyout of Epix, it continued to license its  
15 motion pictures to Epix for exhibition via pay television and SVOD, including over  
16 the Internet.

17 43. In January 2023, Epix was rebranded as MGM+.

18 *The Pension Plan’s MGM Supplemental Market Audits and Discovery of the MGM-*  
19 *Epix Self-Dealing Licensing Relationship*

20 44. Pursuant to its rights under the Basic Agreement and the Pension Plan  
21 Trust Agreement, the Pension Plan, through its representatives, conducts audits of  
22 Defendant on a regular basis to determine whether Defendant has made all  
23 contributions it owes to the Pension Plan in accordance with the terms of the  
24 relevant Basic Agreements.

25 45. The Pension Plan has engaged a residuals auditor, Nigro Karlin Segal  
26 and Feldstein, LLP (“NKSF”), to conduct regular periodic audits of Defendant’s  
27 contributions to the Plan.  
28

1           46. As relevant here, NKSF conducted three audits of Defendant that  
2 began in 2014, 2017, and 2021. Those audits covered, respectively, the periods  
3 from April 1, 2010, to September 30, 2013; October 1, 2013, to September 30,  
4 2017; and October 1, 2017, to June 30, 2022.

5           47. The final 2010-2013 audit report was submitted to the Pension Plan on  
6 August 29, 2017; the final 2013-2017 audit report was submitted to the Pension  
7 Plan on May 12, 2021; and the final 2017-2022 audit report was submitted to the  
8 Pension Plan on February 5, 2026. In each instance, the Pension Plan shared the  
9 audit results with Defendant.

10           48. In fall 2016—while performing the Pension Plan’s 2010-2013 audit—  
11 NKSF learned from public sources that Defendant’s motion pictures had been  
12 licensed not only to Epix, but also to other SVOD services including Netflix,  
13 Amazon, Paramount+, and Hulu.

14           49. Around the same time, NKSF learned that some or all of Defendant’s  
15 licensing deals with Epix included the right for Epix to subdistribute, subject to  
16 Defendant’s advance written agreement, MGM’s motion pictures to other SVOD  
17 services. On information and belief, Epix (and later MGM+) have exercised that  
18 right by entering into subdistribution deals with other SVOD platforms with  
19 Defendant’s advance written approval.

20           50. During its 2010-2013 period audit, NKSF also learned that the Epix  
21 licensing payment obligations to Defendant were lower than those in licenses  
22 Defendant had previously negotiated with Showtime for pay television rights,  
23 notwithstanding that Defendant had granted Epix the additional and extremely  
24 valuable SVOD subdistribution rights for no additional consideration.

25           51. On or around September 22, 2016, NKSF requested documentation to  
26 determine whether contributions paid to the Pension Plan on account of MGM’s  
27 Employer’s gross properly valued the rights MGM granted to Epix, and whether the  
28

1 contributions accounted for subdistribution revenue Epix obtained from licensing  
2 Defendant's motion pictures to other SVOD services.

3 52. During subsequent audits, NKSF again requested, on or around April  
4 3, 2018, and on or around January 23, 2023, similar documentation to determine  
5 whether contributions paid to the Pension Plan on account of MGM's Employer's  
6 gross properly valued the rights MGM granted Epix in those audit periods, and  
7 whether the contributions accounted for subdistribution revenue Epix obtained from  
8 licensing the motion pictures to other SVOD services during those audit periods.

9 53. Defendant reports its receipts from the licensing of its motion pictures  
10 in Supplemental Markets and New Media (including in SVOD) on a quarterly basis  
11 in a document that identifies only the total receipts received for each motion  
12 picture. The quarterly reports do not, however, provide the information required to  
13 determine whether Defendant has properly represented its Employer's gross for  
14 each such motion picture on which contributions are made under the Basic  
15 Agreement and Sideletter 15.

16 54. Notwithstanding NKSF's requests for additional documentation,  
17 Defendant has refused to provide information sufficient to enable NKSF or the  
18 Pension Plan to determine the true Employer's gross as to which contributions are  
19 due, given the nature of Epix's SVOD licensing rights, and Epix's subdistribution  
20 of Defendant's motion pictures to other SVOD services.

21 55. On information and belief, Defendant has, since the beginning of the  
22 MGM-Epix license relationship, failed to report or pay contributions representing  
23 the value of the SVOD and subdistribution rights MGM granted Epix and MGM+.

24 56. In each audit report, NKSF noted that MGM was unwilling to provide  
25 it the necessary documentation to identify Supplemental Market and New Media  
26 transactions potentially precipitating additional contribution obligations, or to  
27 provide the information necessary for NKSF to ascertain the magnitude of any  
28 contribution underpayment. As such, NKSF and the Pension Plan have treated such

1 disputes as unresolved or “Open Issues,” and the amounts owed in additional  
2 contributions as “Undetermined.”

3 *Tolling of Claims Arising From 2010-2013, 2013-2017, 2017-2022 Audit Periods*

4 57. Although the Pension Plan and its auditors continued to press MGM  
5 for records that would identify the motion pictures licensed to Epix for the 2010-  
6 2013, 2013-2017, and 2017-2022 audit periods, as well as the records from which  
7 the Pension Plan and its auditors could determine whether the Employer’s gross  
8 was undervalued under the terms of the Basic Agreements and Sideletter 15, MGM  
9 continued to refuse to provide the documents, stating that disputes related to the  
10 MGM-Epix licensing arrangements “are being handled separately from resolution  
11 of other issues.”

12 58. MGM’s statement that the Epix claims “are being handled separately”  
13 referred to MGM’s and the DGA’s discussions and, ultimately, arbitration  
14 proceedings to resolve the DGA’s concerns regarding the proper accounting of the  
15 Employer’s gross in connection with the MGM-Epix licensing arrangement directly  
16 under the terms of the Basic Agreements, including Sideletter 15.

17 59. Accordingly, the Pension Plan agreed to put off resolution of its  
18 concerns pending MGM’s and the DGA’s discussions that ultimately resulted in  
19 arbitration proceedings between the DGA and MGM. At the same time, MGM  
20 continued to refuse to provide the Pension Plan with documents necessary to  
21 determine whether the licensing to Epix of any particular motion picture during the  
22 audit periods created a claim for additional pension contributions, let alone the  
23 amount of any underpayment that might have accrued.

24 60. The Pension Plan is not a party to the DGA-MGM arbitration and is  
25 not privy to its confidential proceedings.

26 61. Consistent with the parties’ past practice in dealing with disputes over  
27 benefit contribution obligations under the Basic Agreements that are ancillary to  
28 employer residual or additional compensation obligations to the DGA for

1 employees covered by the Basic Agreement, the Pension Plan agreed with MGM to  
2 enter into agreements to toll potential Pension Plan claims arising out of  
3 underreported Employer's gross related to the MGM-Epix licensing arrangement.

4 62. With respect to MGM-Epix Open Issues identified by NKSF arising in  
5 the 2010-2013 and 2013-2017 audit periods, Defendant and the Pension Plan have  
6 entered into a series of tolling agreements, the latest of which are open-ended and  
7 continue to toll "the statute of limitations[]" and any other time bar" regarding the  
8 Open Issues indefinitely, with termination requiring a 30-day written notice. To  
9 date, neither party has sought to terminate the 2010-2013 or 2013-2017 audit period  
10 tolling agreements.

11 63. Defendant and the Pension Plan also entered into a 12-month tolling  
12 agreement regarding the 2017-2022 audit period on December 8, 2021 (prior to the  
13 end of the audit period itself), stating that "[i]n order for the audit process to be  
14 completed," the parties agreed that "the statute of limitations period, and any other  
15 time bar, shall be tolled" until the termination of the agreement on December 7,  
16 2022. Subsequently, the Pension Plan and Defendant entered into two materially  
17 identical tolling agreements covering all periods until December 7, 2024. More  
18 recently, however, Defendant has refused to renew the tolling agreement for periods  
19 after December 7, 2024, to encompass all claims regarding the MGM-Epix Open  
20 Issues considered by NKSF arising in the 2017-2022 audit period.

21 64. As a result of Defendant's refusal to renew a tolling agreement to  
22 cover all such claims, the Pension Plan has brought this suit to protect its rights  
23 under ERISA and the LMRA.

24 COUNT ONE

25 (Failure to Comply With Audit Obligations—by all Plaintiffs)

26 65. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-64.

27 66. Under the Basic Agreements Defendant has for all relevant periods  
28 agreed to be bound by the terms and Provisions of the Trust Agreement, including

1 to comply with the obligations to permit audits and inspections of documents  
2 relevant to Defendant's Supplemental Market and New Media contribution  
3 obligations.

4 67. Notwithstanding repeated requests by the Pension Plan's auditors for  
5 documents necessary to determine whether Defendant, for the 2010-2013, 2013-  
6 2017, and 2017-2022 audit periods, has properly made Pension Plan contributions  
7 on Defendant's Employer's gross for motion pictures licensed during the audit  
8 periods by MGM to Epix for distribution and exhibition in Supplemental Markets  
9 and New Media, Defendant has refused to provide such information.

10 68. Defendant's failure to provide records necessary to determine whether  
11 motion pictures produced by MGM and licensed during the audit periods reflected  
12 the proper measure of Employer's gross, makes it impossible for the Pension Plan  
13 or its representatives to determine contribution delinquencies with respect to SVOD  
14 licensing of Defendant's motion pictures to or through Epix.

15 69. Defendant's failure and refusal to comply with its audit obligations as  
16 related to the 2010-2013, 2013-2017, and 2017-2022 Supplemental Market  
17 Inspection audits of Defendant, as set out above in Paragraphs 26-27, 56-57  
18 constitute breaches of its obligations under the Basic Agreements and under the  
19 Trust Agreement. The Pension Plan and the Trustees are authorized to bring this  
20 claim to redress such breaches of the Basic Agreements and Trust Agreement under  
21 Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29  
22 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).

23 70. Under the Basic Agreements and the Trust Agreement, Defendant also  
24 is liable for attorneys' fees, court costs, interest, liquidated damages, and auditing  
25 costs in connection enforcing delinquent contribution obligations to the Pension  
26 Plan.

27 71. Under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and Section  
28 502(g)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), Plaintiffs are entitled to enforce their

1 right to conduct a complete audit of Defendant's records, to reasonable attorneys'  
 2 fees and costs of this action, and to the additional audit costs that will be necessary  
 3 because of Defendant's breach of its obligations under the collective-bargaining  
 4 agreements and under the Trust Agreement.

## 5 COUNT TWO

### 6 (Breach of Contribution Obligations—By Plaintiff Pension Plan)

7 72. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-71.

8 73. Under the Basic Agreements, including Sideletter 15, Defendant is  
 9 required to pay the Pension Plan 0.4% of the Employer's gross of pay television,  
 10 SVOD, and other distribution licensing amounts with respect to each motion picture  
 11 produced by MGM and licensed in Supplemental Markets or New Media.

12 74. Defendant's licensing of pay television and SVOD distribution rights  
 13 to Epix for motion pictures produced from April 1, 2010, to January 15, 2023,  
 14 constitute transactions with a "related or affiliated entity."

15 75. Defendant's licensing of SVOD distribution rights to MGM+ for  
 16 motion pictures produced since January 15, 2023, constitute transactions with a  
 17 "related or affiliated entity."

18 76. Defendant's Employer's gross derived from New Media licensing  
 19 transactions with Epix and MGM+ is subject to Sideletter 15 and should be  
 20 measured by reference to licensing transactions between unrelated and unaffiliated  
 21 parties, in accordance with the standard set out above in Paragraph 33.

22 77. On information and belief, Defendant's reporting of the Employer's  
 23 gross for motion pictures it licensed to Epix and to MGM+ understates the  
 24 appropriate arms-length measurement of the value of the motion picture license  
 25 payment obligations for distributing Defendant's motion pictures for exhibition in  
 26 pay television and SVOD.

27 78. Pursuant to the Basic Agreement, including Sideletter 15, when the  
 28 Defendant does not conduct all the distribution of its motion pictures directly in

1 Supplemental Markets and New Media, including the SVOD market, but rather  
2 employs a subdistributor to distribute the motion pictures, then the Defendant's  
3 Employer's gross should include the worldwide total gross receipts derived by the  
4 subdistributor.

5 79. On information and belief, Epix acted as a subdistributor of  
6 Defendant's motion pictures, and subdistributed Defendant's motion pictures  
7 produced since April 1, 2010, to other SVOD platforms, including Netflix, Hulu,  
8 Paramount+, and Amazon, and received substantial revenues for licensing the  
9 motion picture SVOD exhibition rights.

10 80. The SVOD subdistribution revenues obtained by Epix from  
11 subdistributing Defendant's motion pictures to third-party SVOD platforms have  
12 not been included in the Employer's gross reported by Defendant to the Pension  
13 Plan.

14 81. Although Defendant has refused to provide the Pension Plan  
15 documents and records from which the Pension Plan could make a determination of  
16 the correctness of Defendant's Supplemental Market and New Media payments  
17 with respect to motion pictures MGM has licensed to Epix, on information and  
18 belief, the self-dealing transactions between Defendant on the one hand, and Epix  
19 and MGM+ on the other, substantially understated the proper measurement of the  
20 Employer's gross on which contributions are due.

21 82. On information and belief, Defendant's artificially understated  
22 Employer's gross with respect to motion pictures Defendant licensed since April 1,  
23 2010, to Epix and, since January 15, 2023, to MGM+ has resulted in Defendant  
24 underpaying the Pension Plan the full amounts of contributions owed it. Because  
25 Defendant has refused to provide the Pension Plan and its auditors records  
26 reflecting the transactions by Epix necessary to confirm the proper measurement of  
27 the Employer's gross for each motion picture on which Defendant owes  
28

1 contributions, the Pension Plan is unaware of when underpayments may have  
2 accrued, and the extent of underpayments.

3 83. The underpayments, in amounts to be proven at trial, constitute a  
4 breach of Defendant's obligations under the Basic Agreements and the Trust  
5 Agreement. The breaches have injured the Pension Plan and the participants and  
6 beneficiaries for whom it is obligated to provide pension benefits.

7 84. The Pension Plan is an intended third-party beneficiary of the Basic  
8 Agreements, including Sideletter 15, and is expressly permitted to assert its rights  
9 under the Basic Agreements.

10 85. The Pension Plan is entitled to redress that breach of the Basic  
11 Agreement, including Sideletter 15, under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.  
12 § 185(a).

13 86. Under the terms of the Basic Agreement, including provisions  
14 extending time limits to the same extent as provided by California statutes of  
15 limitations, and by the Tolling Agreements related to the 2010-2013, 2013-2017,  
16 and 2017-2022 time periods described in Paragraphs 57-64 above, the time to assert  
17 claims under LMRA § 301 has not expired as to any underpayment, known or  
18 unknown.

### 19 COUNT THREE

#### 20 (Breach of Contribution Obligation—By Plaintiff Trustees)

21 87. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-86.

22 88. Defendant is obligated to make pension contributions to the Pension  
23 Plan consistent with the terms of the Basic Agreements and the Trust Agreement.

24 89. Under the Basic Agreements, including Sideletter 15, Defendant is  
25 required to pay Pension Plan contributions of 0.4% of the Employer's gross of pay  
26 television, SVOD, and other distribution licensing amounts with respect to each  
27 motion picture produced by MGM and licensed in Supplemental Markets or New  
28 Media.

1           90. Defendant’s licensing of pay television and SVOD distribution rights  
2 to Epix for motion pictures produced from April 1, 2010, to January 15, 2023,  
3 constitute transactions with a “related or affiliated entity.”

4           91. Defendant’s licensing of pay television and SVOD distribution rights  
5 to MGM+ for motion pictures produced since January 15, 2023, constitute  
6 transactions with a “related or affiliated entity.”

7           92. Defendant’s Employer’s gross derived from New Media licensing  
8 transactions with Epix and MGM+ is subject to Sideletter 15 and should be  
9 measured by reference to licensing transactions between unrelated and unaffiliated  
10 parties, in accordance with the standard set out above in Paragraph 32.

11           93. On information and belief, Defendant’s reporting of the Employer’s  
12 gross for motion pictures it licensed to Epix and to MGM+ understates the  
13 appropriate arms-length measurement of the value of the motion picture license  
14 payment obligations for distributing Defendant’s motion pictures for exhibition in  
15 pay television and SVOD.

16           94. Pursuant to the Basic Agreement, including Sideletter 15, when the  
17 Defendant does not conduct all the distribution of its motion pictures directly in  
18 Supplemental Markets and New Media, including the SVOD market, but rather  
19 employs a subdistributor to distribute the motion pictures, then the Defendant’s  
20 Employer’s gross should include the worldwide total gross receipts derived by the  
21 subdistributor.

22           95. On information and belief, Epix acted as a subdistributor of  
23 Defendant’s motion pictures, and subdistributed Defendant’s motion pictures  
24 produced since April 1, 2010, to other SVOD platforms, including Netflix, Hulu,  
25 Paramount+, and Amazon, and received substantial revenues for licensing the  
26 motion picture SVOD exhibition rights.

27           96. The SVOD subdistribution revenues obtained by Epix from  
28 subdistributing Defendant’s motion pictures to third-party SVOD platforms have

1 not been included in the Employer's gross reported by Defendant to the Pension  
2 Plan.

3 97. Although Defendant has refused to provide the Pension Plan  
4 documents and records from which the Pension Plan could make a determination of  
5 the correctness of Defendant's Supplemental Market and New Media payments  
6 with respect to motion pictures MGM has licensed to Epix, on information and  
7 belief, the self-dealing transactions between Defendant on the one hand, and Epix  
8 and MGM+ on the other, substantially understated the proper measurement of the  
9 Employer's gross on which contributions are due.

10 98. On information and belief, Defendant's artificially understated  
11 Employer's gross with respect to motion pictures Defendant licensed since April 1,  
12 2010, to Epix and, since January 15, 2023, to MGM+ has resulted in Defendant  
13 underpaying the Pension Plan the full amounts of contributions owed it. Because  
14 Defendant has refused to provide the Pension Plan and its auditors records  
15 reflecting the transactions by Epix necessary to confirm the proper measurement of  
16 the Employer's gross on which Defendant owes contributions, the Pension Plan is  
17 unaware of when underpayments may have accrued, and the extent of  
18 underpayments.

19 99. The underpayments, in amounts to be proven at trial, constitute  
20 violations of Defendant's pension contribution obligations under the Basic  
21 Agreements and the Trust Agreement. The Trustees are empowered to assert claims  
22 to recover such contribution for the Pension Plan and for the participants and  
23 beneficiaries for whom the Pension Plan provides pension benefits.

24 100. Under ERISA § 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, and ERISA § 502(g)(2), 29  
25 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), Defendant is liable to the Pension Plan to pay the full amount  
26 of its delinquent contributions as determined in these proceedings, plus interest,  
27 liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs of this action.  
28

COUNT FOUR

(Breach of Contribution Obligation for the 2017-2022 Supplemental Market Audit  
Liquidated Claims—By All Plaintiffs)

101. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-100.

102. In addition to the Open Items discussed above, NKSF also identified in its February 5, 2026, audit report an additional \$540,426 of unpaid contributions owed to the Pension Plan (excluding interest) for the 2017-2022 audit period, unrelated to Defendant's failure to make proper Pension Plan contributions on Defendant's Employer's gross for motion pictures licensed during the audit periods by MGM to Epix for distribution and exhibition in Supplemental Markets and New Media. As of June 23, 2026, additional Open Items remain outstanding, and additional audit work may disclose additional delinquent contributions beyond the quantified amounts set out above.

103. The claims for these unpaid contributions are timely under the terms of the Basic Agreements and the tolling agreements relating to the 2017-2022 audit period, described in Paragraph 63 above.

104. By letter dated February 12, 2026, the Pension Plan has demanded that MGM pay the delinquent Pension Plan contributions, but to date MGM has refused.

105. Pursuant to the Basic Agreements in effect between MGM and the DGA since October 1, 2017, the Trust Agreement, Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and Sections 502(a)(3), (g), and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3), (g), 1145, Defendant is liable to the Pension Plan for all unpaid contributions, plus liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs of this action.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

A. Declare that Defendant's failure and refusal to provide the records that have been determined by the Pension Plan's representatives to be necessary for complete audits of Defendant's Supplemental Markets contribution obligation to the Pension Plan violates Defendant's obligations under the Basic Agreements and the Trust Agreement;

B. Order Defendant to produce all records reasonably requested by the Pension Plan's auditors for the purpose of completing audits of Defendant's obligations to make Supplemental Market and New Media contributions to the Pension Plan for the time period of April 1, 2010, through the present;

C. Award a judgment in the full amount of the delinquent Supplemental Market and New Media contributions Defendant owes to the Pension Plan for the period from April 1, 2010, through the present, together with interest and liquidated damages, as required by the Basic Agreements, the Trust Agreement, and by ERISA Section 502(g)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2);

D. Award plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to the Trust Agreement and Sections 502(g)(1), and (2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), and (2); and

E. Order such other legal and equitable relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate.

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
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1 Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all claims so triable.

2  
3 Dated: June 26, 2026



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24  
25 A copy of this Complaint will be served upon the Secretary of Labor and the  
26 Secretary of the Treasury by certified mail, as required by ERISA Section 502(h),  
27 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h).  
28